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THE LIFE, DEATH, AND REBIRTH OF THE 
“CULTURAL EXCEPTION” IN THE 
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM: AN 
EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF CULTURAL 
PROTECTION AND INTERVENTION IN THE 
FACE OF AMERICAN POP CULTURE’S 
HEGEMONY 
INTRODUCTION 
International relations-globalization literature is replete with bleak 
forecasts regarding the fate of states’ cultural identity in the context of the 
hegemonic ideology of the neoliberal trading system.1 Self-interest, 
domestic pressure, bias, ignorance, and uncertainty have all compelled 
states to respond to extant global trade climates by creating unique public 
policy instruments to justify deviations from the standard GATT/WTO 
legal framework2 and to withstand complete liberalization3 in certain 
sectors of the global economy. For example, negotiations in the 
audiovisual sector have historically been plagued by problems of ill-
definition, misperception, and intransigence.4 These problems are co-
 1. Neoliberalism is a political-economic school of thought that encourages deregulation, 
privatization, and free trade. Often associated with the free activity of capitalist economies 
unconstrained by the government or civil society, neoliberalism is built upon neo-classical price 
theory. For an unflattering account of neoliberalism, see Susan George, A Short History of 
Neoliberalism, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/econ/histneol.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2004).  
 2. The overarching goal of the GATT/WTO legal framework is to liberalize trade in pursuit of 
greater global welfare. This is to be achieved by strict adherence to the norm of nondiscrimination 
through such principles as “most-favored-nation treatment,” and “national treatment.” The principle of 
most-favored-nation treatment, found in article I of the initial General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), requires World Trade Organization (WTO) member states to treat the goods and services of 
all other member states similarly. The principle of “National Treatment” in article III of the GATT 
requires WTO member states to treat national goods and services and foreign goods and services in the 
state’s domestic market alike. The GATT provided the basic legal framework of the multilateral 
trading system from Jan. 1, 1948, until Jan. 1, 1995, when the WTO entered into force and the 1947 
GATT text was updated to become “GATT 1994.” See infra note 13.  
 3. Complete liberalization reflects a world in which the global markets reign uninhibited by 
tariffs, quotas, and informal trade barriers. In theory, consumer sovereignty is maximized by access to 
the best products at the best price. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 342, 346, 348–49, 
424, 444–45 (1776).  
 4. Victoria de Grazia, Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge to European 
Cinemas, 1920–1960, 61 J. MOD. HIST. 53–87 (1989); DAVID ELLWOOD & ROB KROES, HOLLYWOOD 
IN EUROPE, EXPERIENCES OF CULTURAL HEGEMONY (1994); RICHARD KUISEL, SEDUCING THE 
FRENCH: THE DILEMMA OF AMERICANIZATION (1993); RICHARD PELLS, NOT LIKE US: HOW 
EUROPEANS HAVE LOVED, HATED, AND TRANSFORMED AMERICAN CULTURE SINCE WORLD WAR II 
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determined by the dominance of American Popular Culture5 and the 
complementary evolution of the “cultural exception” doctrine as a policy 
response designed to neutralize this dominance. The cultural exception 
doctrine resulted in a long-standing international public relations war 
alternatively boxed in the rhetoric of “Americanization”6 and “anti-
Americanism”.7 While its halcyon days were as recent as the last decade, 
the exigencies of the “new economy”8 and its accompanying technology, 
coupled with globalization’s hallmarks of consolidation, integration, and 
harmonization,9 have led one interested party to boldly proclaim “the 
cultural exception is dead.”10  
This Note proceeds by examining the confluence of multilateral trade 
policy, cultural identity, and the vitriol of the “Americanization” and “anti-
Americanism” rhetoric through an assessment of the genesis, evolution, 
and current vitality of the “cultural exception” doctrine as applied to the 
audiovisual sector. Part I defines the cultural exception doctrine, pinpoints 
its origins and modern sources in the international trade architecture, and 
introduces the divide that exists between believers and non-believers. Part 
II evaluates the legal, economic, and social justifications traditionally 
offered in its support, emphasizing the problems of ill-definition and 
misperception. Part III examines several key developments that have 
impacted the audiovisual sector since the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, with a determinative outlook as 
(1997). 
 5. See World Trade Organization, Council for Trade in Services, Audiovisual Services, 
S/C/W/40(98-2437), June 15, 1998; OECD, Content as a New Growth Industry, DSTI/ICCP/ 
IE(96)6/FINAL, May 22, 1998; OECD, Policy and Regulatory Issues for Network-Based Content 
Services, DSTI/ICCP/IE(96)9/REV1 (and CORR1), Aug. 4, 1997; European Commission, Panorama 
of EU Industry 1997; European Audiovisual Observatory, Statistical Yearbook 1997, Strasbourg. 
 6. Victoria de Grazia, Americanization and Europeanization, EUR. STUD. NEWS. (Council for 
European Studies), June 2001; Elizabeth Franck, Americanization of Messier: Vivendi Boss Loses 
Billions, NEW YORK OBSERVER, Mar. 11, 2002, at A1. 
 7. See L’ANTIAMÉRICANISME=ANTI-AMERICAN AT HOME AND ABROAD: ACTES DU COLLOQUE 
DES 26 ET 27 MARS 1999 (Sylvie Mathé, ed., 2000); Darrin McMahon, Echoes of a Recent Past: 
Contemporary French Anti-Americanism in Historical and Cultural Perspective, COLUM. INT’L AFF. 
ONLINE, available at http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/mcd01/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). 
 8. For a discussion of the relationship between culture and the “new economy,” see HARVEY B. 
FEIGENBAUM, GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURAL DIPLOMACY 32 (2001).  
 9. Joseph M. Grieco & G. John Ikenberry, Economic Globalization and its Discontents, 
available at http://www.duke.edu/~pfeaver/grieco_reading.chapter6.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2004) 
(defining globalization as “the fastest growing integration since World War II of the national 
economies of most of the advanced-industrialized countries of the world, and an increasing number of 
developing nations, to the degree that we may be witnessing the emergence and operation of a single 
worldwide economy . . . Globalization is, however, not only about economic integration . . . it also 
includes an increase in cross-border political, social, cultural and technological exchanges”). 
 10. See Franck, supra note 6; see also Meara Cavanaugh, Messier: Threat to French Culture?, 
CNN.COM (Apr. 17, 2002), http://www.cnn.com/2002/BUSINESS/04/17/messier/index.html (on file 
with the Washington University Global Studies Law Review). 
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p909 Galt.doc  7/21/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004]   LIFE, DEATH, AND REBIRTH OF THE “CULTURAL EXCEPTION” 911 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to whether the doctrine is alive and well or on its last leg. The Note 
concludes with a speculative exploration of the doctrine’s future. 
I. DEFINITION, POSSIBLE ORIGINS, AND MODERN SOURCES  
The idea of state protection of cultural identity has existed for many 
years, arguably reaching as far back as the origins of state sovereignty.11 
However, the modern doctrine of the cultural exception12 did not begin to 
take shape until the establishment of the multilateral trading system.13 Yet, 
the problems of bias, political self-interest, misperception, and 
intransigence that have historically plagued trade in the audiovisual sector 
are the very same problems that make selecting a working definition of the 
doctrine a difficult task. Once all the showmanship and spurious theories 
are teased out of the process, we are left with a raw marrow that 
recognizes the sensitive nature of the audiovisual sector and the desire to 
exempt this sector from standard GATT/WTO legal obligations.14
Though not specifically articulated as such, advocates of the cultural 
exception would suggest that one definition of the doctrine in the 
multilateral trading system can be found in article IV, part II of the 1947 
GATT.15 The “Special Provisions Relating to Cinematograph Films”16 
 11. Danielle S. Petito, Sovereignty and Globalization: Fallacies, Truth, and Perception, 17 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1139 (2001). 
 12. This is also known as “cultural exclusion” and “cultural specificity.” For distinctions between 
the three, see Denise Prévost, The Relationship Between Trade and Cultural Identity: The Question of 
Linkage, Prepared for the Referatendagen in Maastricht (Feb. 10–12, 1999), http://www.rechten. 
unimaas.nl/ozic/referatendagen%201999/prevost.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).  
 13. Since the end of World War II, the ninth round of multilateral trade negotiations has begun. 
The first eight rounds took place under the framework of a progressively strengthening legal regime, 
known as the GATT. The eighth round of multilateral trade negotiations (Uruguay Round) culminated 
in the institutionalization of the regime in a body of binding legal norms to be enforced by the WTO. 
 14. The “most-favored-nation treatment” and the “national treatment” principles of 
nondiscrimination are relaxed under this scenario. Compare with UNESCO, Division of Creativity, 
Cultural Industries, and Copyright Sector for Culture, Culture, Trade, and Globalization: Questions 
and Answers, available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/industries/trade/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 
14, 2004).  
 15. GATT, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188. See generally, Sandrine Cahn & Daniel 
Schimmel, The Cultural Exception: Does it Exist in GATT and GATS Frameworks? How Does it 
Affect or is it Affected by the Agreement on TRIPS?, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 281, 286 (1997). 
 16. Article IV reads:  
If any contracting party establishes or maintains internal quantitative restrictions relating to 
exposed cinematographic films, such regulations shall conform to the following requirements: 
(a) Screen quotas may require the exhibition of cinematographic films of national origin 
during a specified minimum proportion of the total screen time actually utilized, over a 
specific period of not less than one year, in the commercial exhibition of all films of whatever 
origin, and shall be computed on the basis of screen time per theater per year or the equivalent 
thereof. 
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responded to Hollywood’s pursuit of the European film market during the 
interwar years17 and the subsequent inundation of this market with 
American films in the wake of World War II.18 Prior to the 1947 
Agreement the majority of films shown in Western Europe were 
American-made. Fearing the impact this onslaught would have on 
European cultural identity and values, several countries imposed quotas on 
the number of American movies shown in their countries.19 While these 
measures were ultimately short-lived, they were undoubtedly the 
forbearers of the screen quota institutionalized in article IV of the GATT. 
The decision of the GATT’s contracting parties to limit the application of 
a cultural exception to this single industry likely reflected both a 
generalized perpetuation of the pre-war Americanization fears20 and a 
recognition of the media’s unique power to persuade.21
More devout adherents of the cultural exception have pointed to two 
other GATT provisions for support of the doctrine’s early roots in the 
multilateral trading system: article XIX and article XX(f).22 Article XIX 
provides for an “emergency” derogation from standard nondiscrimination 
obligations when the competitive forces of the marketplace threaten to 
overwhelm a domestic industry.23 Thus, the cultural exception doctrine is 
allowed if competition is so fierce that the audiovisual sector’s very 
survival is in jeopardy.24 Article XX(f),25 one of a limited set of general 
exceptions delineated in the GATT,26 is a rather open-ended provision that 
permits states to derogate from nondiscrimination obligations in order to 
protect “national cultural treasures.”27 Although some cultural exception 
See GATT, supra note 15, art. IV. 
 17. See generally JOHN TRUMPBOUR, SELLING HOLLYWOOD TO THE WORLD: U.S. AND 
EUROPEAN STRUGGLES FOR MASTERY OF THE GLOBAL FILM INDUSTRY, 1920–1950 (2002). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Europe responded with both numerical quotas (based on absolute number) and screen quotas 
(based on percentage of screen time) even though article IV of the GATT permits screen quotas only. 
See generally JENS ULFF-MØLLER, HOLLYWOOD’S FILM WARS WITH FRANCE: FILM TRADE 
DIPLOMACY AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE FRENCH FILM QUOTA POLICY (2001); KUISEL, supra note 
4. 
 20. See JACOB PALUDAN, JØRGEN STEIN (1966). 
 21. Michael Braun and Leigh Parker, Trade in Culture: Consumable Product or Cherished 
Articulation of a Nation’s Soul?, 22 DENV. J.INT’L L. & POL’Y 155, 182 (1993). 
 22. Compare Cahn & Schimmel, supra note 15, at 284, with Joel Richard Paul, Cultural 
Resistance to Global Governance, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 31 (2000).  
 23. This provision is sometimes known as the “escape clause.” See GATT, supra note 15, art. 
XIX. 
 24. Cahn & Schimmel, supra note 15, at 285. 
 25. GATT, supra note 15, art. XX(f). 
 26. In addition to the “national cultural treasures” exception, article XX permits the contracting 
parties to make “general exceptions” for protection of natural resources, public health, and public 
morality. See GATT, supra note 15, art. XX(a)–(j). 
 27. GATT, supra note 15, art. XX(f). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/7
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enthusiasts have suggested that all copywritten audiovisual material would 
satisfy this condition,28 a more reasoned analysis would suggest the intent 
of this provision was to protect objects of “high culture” typically found in 
the museums of the world.29 To conclude otherwise leads to such absurd 
results as Bruce Springsteen’s Born in the USA and Federico Fellini’s La 
Dolce Vita falling within the scope of article XX protection.30
In 1988, advocates of the doctrine scored a major victory when 
Canadian negotiators introduced31 the “cultural exclusion” doctrine32 in 
articles 2005 and 2012 of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement.33 Five 
years later, the idea of excluding certain cultural industries was readopted 
in the North American Free Trade Agreement,34 when the same CFTA 
provisions were incorporated by reference in Annex 2106 of NAFTA.35 
Even a cursory examination of these provisions leaves little doubt that the 
drafters specifically intended several industries within the audiovisual 
sector to fall within the shadow of cultural protection.36 However, the 
 28. Cahn & Schimmel, supra note 15, at 284. 
 29. A contextual analysis of article XX(f)—”measures . . . imposed for the protection of national 
treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value”—leaves little doubt of the contracting parties’ 
intent. But see Harry Hillman Chartrand, International Cultural Affairs: A 14 Country Survey, 22 J. 
ARTS MGMT., LAW & SOC’Y 2 (1992) (“In principle, this provision could be extended to the cultural 
industries to provide protection of cultural identity.”)  
 30. Ironically, some promoters of the cultural exception have suggested that the cumulative 
effect of the U.S. “reverse clause” (appended to the Florence Agreement) and its subsequent Nairobi 
Protocol was to create a cultural exception even before this notion was developed. One may also 
reference the reserve mechanisms found in the United States’ adhesion to The Florence Agreement. 
The Florence Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Materials (1950); 
Annex C-1 of the Nairobi Protocol (1976); and UNESCO, supra note 14, at Question 19. However, 
these soft-law instruments, adopted under the auspices of UNESCO, lack the binding force of the rules 
and obligations contained within the GATT/WTO legal framework. For a general discussion of the 
role soft-law instruments play in international law, see Chris Inglese, Soft Law?, POLISH YEARBOOK 
OF INT’L L. 20 (1993). 
 31. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 3–4 (1990) (characterizing institutions as the “rules of the game”). To 
“institutionalize” means to alter the rules of the game. Id. 
 32. Prevost, supra note 12. 
 33. Can.-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, H.R. Doc. No. 216, 100th Cong. (1988), 
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988) [hereinafter CFTA]. 
 34. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) 
[hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 35. Cahn & Schimmel, supra note 15, at 308. 
 36. Section 1, article 2005 of the CFTA is quite explicit: “Cultural industries are exempt from the 
provisions of this Agreement.” CFTA, supra note 33, art. 2005. Article 2012 defines cultural industries 
as: 
an enterprise engaged in . . . a) the publication, distribution, or sale of books, magazines, 
periodicals, or newspapers in print or machine-readable form, but not including the sole 
activity of printing or typesetting any of the foregoing, b) the production, distribution, sale or 
exhibition of film or video recordings, c) the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of 
audio or video music recordings, d) the publication, distribution, or sale of music in print or 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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extent to which these provisions would take precedence over conflicting 
provisions within the WTO framework was clarified by a de facto 
rejection of the cultural exception doctrine by a panel of the Dispute 
Settlement Body.37  
While true believers point to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round as 
further evidence of the cultural exception in the international trade 
architecture, non-believers point to the very same event as evidence of its 
death knell.38 In the final days of the GATS negotiations,39 the audiovisual 
sector was still on the negotiating table, being considered in conjunction 
with civil aircraft, financial services, and maritime transportation.40 As EU 
and US trade representatives reached an impasse, it appeared that years of 
negotiations were unraveling. The solution, euphemistically hailed as the 
“Agreement to Disagree,”41 pulled the audiovisual services sector into the 
GATS framework, but allowed the EU to maintain the market access and 
national treatment exclusions42 necessary to preserve its audiovisual 
policy.43  
machine readable form, or e) radio communication in which the transmissions are intended 
for direct reception by the general public, and all radio, television and cable television 
broadcasting undertakings and all satellite programming and broadcast network services.  
CFTA, supra note 33, art. 2012.  
 37. Paul, supra note 22, at 42–52. The panel’s decision (later affirmed by the Appellate Body of 
the W.T.O.) regarding the GATT-legality of a Canadian excise tax on split-run periodicals will be 
addressed in more detail in Part III. See infra notes 117–31 and accompanying text. 
 38. See Luc Veron, Hollywood and Europe: A Case of Trade in Cultural Industries, the 1993 
GATT Dispute, COLUM. INT’L AFF. ONLINE, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ue/vel (last visited Apr. 13, 
2004); Lisa L. Garrett, Commerce Versus Culture: The Battle Between the United States and the 
European Union Over Audiovisual Trade Policies, 19 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 553, 554–56 
(1994). 
 39. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakech Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. GATS is the services analog 
to the GATT. Several years younger and much less developed, GATS applies the same 
nondiscrimination principles as the GATT. For a more detailed definition, see UNESCO, supra note 
12, at Question 13. 
 40. Veron, supra note 38. 
 41. THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Dec. 17, 1993, at 3; see also Agreed to Disagree: GATT Goes 
Forward by Dropping TV and Film Issues, COMM. DAILY, Dec. 15, 1993, at 2.  
 42. The WTO has been concerned about the global misperception regarding market access and 
national treatment commitments of GATS. Specifically, a recent report by the World Development 
Movement caused concern. The WTO responded to the criticisms on its website, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/misinf_e/oolist_e.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). See 
also Given, infra note 121.  
 43. The 1989 “Television without Frontiers” Directive, implementing the Council of Europe’s 
European Convention on Transfrontier Television and amended in 1997, remains the centerpiece of 
the European Union’s audiovisual policy. It has the effect of limiting the number of American films 
that can be shown on European television and in European movie theaters by mandating that a 
majority (fifty-one percent) of broadcast time be reserved for films of European origin. France upped 
the minimum to 60 percent. See Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
June 30, 1997, amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC; Ramezzana, infra note 54. See also Joongi 
Kim, The Cultural Exception under the International Trade Regime, COALITION FOR CULTURAL 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/7
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Unfortunately, this solution does little to inform us of the doctrine’s 
fate in the multilateral trading system. Non-believers argue that no explicit 
cultural exception can be found in the text of the Final Act of the Uruguay 
Round and that the consequent inclusion of the audiovisual services sector 
within the GATS framework is both a clear indication of its obsolete status 
and a positive affirmation of its tenuous legal origins. However, the 
question still remains as to why audiovisual goods were not included in 
the “Agreement to Disagree.” Moreover, just days after the Round’s 
conclusion, French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur claimed that, “the 
cultural identity of Europe (had been) protected.”44 This single episode and 
the disparate responses it spawned encapsulates the problems of ill-
definition, misperception, and intransigence that have plagued the 
audiovisual sector. These problems, both the products and handmaidens of 
the doctrine, continue to fuel the justifications traditionally offered in its 
support. 
II. MISGUIDED JUSTIFICATIONS  
The preceding section suggests that although the cultural exception 
doctrine has a resolute following, its tenuous legal origins and its 
ambivalent modern sources within the multilateral trading system render 
its current status murky at best. Adding to the debate are several legal, 
economic, and social justifications offered in the cultural exception 
doctrine’s support. This section will evaluate these justifications and 
demonstrate the degree to which each is misguided.  
Though no GATT/WTO provision speaks directly of a cultural 
exception, current supporters of the doctrine have presumed its conformity 
with pre-existing law. They rely upon ancient notions of sovereignty and 
the traditional property canon of exclusion.45 Such reliance is 
fundamentally flawed and outdated.46 Significant cessions of state power 
to organizations such as the WTO in pursuit of freer trade and enhanced 
global welfare have opened states’ domestic systems of property rights to 
DIVERSITY IN MOVING IMAGES, http://www.screenquota.org/menupage/newsPage_disp.asp?num=46& 
gotopage=1 (last visited Apr. 13, 2004).  
 44. See Veron, supra note 38. 
 45. Kevin V. Mulcahy, Cultural Imperialism and Cultural Sovereignty: U.S.-Canadian Cultural 
Relations, 31 J. ARTS MGMT., LAW, & SOC’Y 265 (2002); Lawrence M. Friedman, Erewhon: The 
Coming Global Legal Order, 37 STANFORD J. INT’L L. 347 (2001); RAYMOND VERNON, 
SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES (1971). 
 46. See generally NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE AND NATION 
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH (1999); Christoph Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State: 
Towards a New Paradigm for International Law?, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 447 (1993).  
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outside influences and have resulted in dramatic re-allocations of 
jurisdiction.47 To suggest that the cultural exception conforms to pre-
existing law is to turn a blind eye to more than fifty years of evolution and 
institutionalization within the multilateral trading system.48 This is not to 
say that globalization and the emergence of supranational entities resulted 
in an across-the-board desertion of the sovereignty principle, but it has 
certainly been modified. Member states continue to pursue tenaciously 
their own domestic agendas under the proviso that they not deviate from 
standard GATT/WTO nondiscrimination obligations.49
This was the understanding of the GATT contracting parties in 1947 
when they completed the first round of trade negotiations. Inherent in this 
initial cession of individual and sovereign powers was a belief that 
“certain public policy objectives took . . . precedence . . . over the freer 
trade goals.”50 These public policy objectives, representing exceptions to 
the norm of progressive liberalization, were spelled out in article XX of 
the GATT.51 In addition to the “national cultural treasures” exception 
previously addressed, general exceptions exist for protection of natural 
resources, public health, and public morality.52 However, no cultural 
exception exists for the protection of cultural identity. Had the contracting 
parties intended to place an explicit exception in the text of the GATT, 
article XX would have been the logical place.  
As addressed above, the cultural exception supporters have also 
exploited the screen quota immortalized in article IV and the article XIX 
emergency derogation provisions as legal justifications for a broad and 
enduring cultural exception within the multilateral trading system.53 These 
specific provisions are applied quite broadly, imaginatively, and, 
consequently, misguidedly. 
Any economic justifications offered in support of the doctrine are 
equally misguided,54 as they frequently run afoul of basic logic and 
 47. Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional Linkage: Transcending “Trade and . . .”, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 
77. 
 48. See North, supra note 31. In the wake of World War II, the nations of the world met in 
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, with the aim of designing institutions that would prevent another 
world war by eliminating the economic causes of war. To this end, three neoliberal institutions were 
created: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the International Trade 
Organization (ITO). Although the ITO died prematurely, its provisional agreement, the GATT, lived 
on. 
 49. Debra P. Steger, The “Trade and . . .” Conundrum—A Commentary, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 135 
(2002). 
 50. Id. at 143. 
 51. GATT, supra note 15, art. XX. 
 52. See supra note 26. 
 53. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
 54. Paolo Ramezzana, Professor of Economics at the University of Virginia, characterizes the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/7
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rationality.55 At the heart of this confusion is a simple classification 
problem. Advocates of the cultural exception doctrine are ensconced in the 
misperception that audiovisual products56 are not private goods, but rather 
hybrids that defy standard economic classification57 because “they reflect 
. . . cultural identities.”58 Audiovisual products, like many products, 
generate significant externalities59 that “have cultural reverberations.”60 
However, such products are commodities subject to excludability and 
rivalry constraints, the points of access to which “are controlled by the 
familiar institutions of private property.”61  
Nonetheless, the persistent drumbeat of the cultural exception 
apologists has led many to the mistaken belief that Americanization is 
exhausting the limited resources of the audiovisual sector62 and 
swallowing up states’ cultural identities.63 However, this belief is both 
illogical and erroneous. First, it effectively correlates one state’s success at 
selling tangible goods in the audiovisual sector to a direct and 
proportionate erosion of another state’s intangible cultural identity. But 
this fallacy rests upon a more fundamental flaw: the erroneous assumption 
that a state’s cultural identity is an exhaustible resource.64 Cultural 
problem this way: “Although these calls for the protection of a country’s culture from the 
consequences of potential market failures may have some merit, the arguments used to support them 
are often based more on a European intellectual tradition of suspicion towards American culture rather 
than on sound and impartial logic.” Paolo Ramezzana, Globalization and Cultural Diversity: The 
Economics of the ‘Cultural Exception,’ Working Paper (2002) (copy on file with author).  
 55. I equate logic and rationality with efficiency, cost-benefit analysis, and the law of 
comparative advantage, all of which are fundamental tenets of neoliberal trade theory. It is generally 
agreed that free trade is good for global welfare. But see Noam Chomsky, Free Trade and Free 
Markets: Pretense and Practice, THE CULTURES OF GLOBALIZATION 356–70 (1989). 
 56. The word “products” is used as an umbrella term for both goods and services. Adding to the 
confusion in this area is a long-standing debate as to whether cultural products are goods or services. 
However, this debate should not be used as some form of misdirection to obscure the fact that cultural 
products are commodities that should be subject to the discipline of the free market.  
 57. While audiovisual products may resemble public goods, they must closely resemble private 
goods. C. Edwin Baker, An Economic Critique of Free Trade in Media Products, 78 N.C. L. REV. 
1357, 1377 (2000).  
 58. Paul, supra note 22, at 37. 
 59. Baker, supra note 57, at 1391. 
 60. Paul, supra note 22, at 41. 
 61. Stanley R. Carpenter, Sustainability and Common-Pool Resources: Alternatives to Tragedy, 
3 J. OF SOC. FOR TECH. AND PHIL. 4 (1998). 
 62. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243–48 (1968).  
 63. See Karen Elizabeth Rinaman, Trade and Culture, Working Paper, TED ANALYSIS CASES, at 
http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted/projects/tedcross/xcult11.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). 
 64. See Anthony J. Liehm, The Cultural Exception: Why?, KINEMA (Fall 1996); We Are Not An 
Average Nation: An Exclusive Talk With Jacques Chirac, TIME, Dec. 11, 1995, at 59; UNESCO, 
World Culture Report 2000: Cultural Diversity, Conflict, and Plurality, available at 
http://www.unesco.org/bpi/WCR2000 (last visited Apr. 9, 2004). 
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exception proponents would have us believe that the production and/or 
consumption of a single unit of American audiovisual product in world 
markets adversely impacts another state’s cultural identity. This approach 
views audiovisual products not as private goods, but as common pool 
resources: shared and exhaustible.65 More specifically, this approach views 
the propensity or taste for audiovisual products as a shared resource, liable 
to tap out at any moment. Proponents of this theory believe that an 
unsuspecting Frenchman’s preferences and consumptive habits will 
disappear after listening to Bruce Springsteen’s Born in the USA, 
somehow depleting his “Frenchness” reserve.  
Even if this micro-level analysis is unpersuasive, the same specious 
reasoning is evident at the macro-level. At either level of analysis the 
suggestion is the same: the production and/or consumption of American 
popular culture results in a net loss of French identity. Proponents of the 
cultural exception have suggested that even where our hypothetical 
Frenchman’s cultural identity is unaffected by the patriotic crooning of 
“The Boss,”66 the distribution and consumption of Born in the USA 
throughout France creates enormous externalities67 that ripple through 
French culture and produce the net effect of a diminished cultural identity 
on a larger scale.  
Extending this fallacious line of reasoning to its conclusion exposes yet 
another flawed economic presumption of the cultural exception doctrine: 
trade in audiovisual products is a zero-sum game.68 According to this 
theory, France’s loss is America’s gain; by extension, where there is a loss 
of French identity, there is a proportionate gain for Americanization. 
Fortunately for global welfare, trade is a positive-sum game. More 
efficient markets lead to greater consumer welfare by offering more 
products at a lower price. There will be both “winners” and “losers” from 
altering trade policy, but the efficiency gains of greater liberalization can 
be redistributed to compensate the “losers.”69 However, paternalistic 
 65. These two central characteristics of common pool resources distinguish them from other 
types of goods. When many people share an exhaustible resource, such as clean air, and there is no 
ability to exclude, the resource is prone to the “tragedy of the commons.” See Hardin, supra note 62.  
 66. “The Boss” is the self-proclaimed nickname of Bruce Springsteen. His nickname has been 
affectionately perpetuated by his fans. 
 67. While trade in audiovisual products undoubtedly creates both positive and negative 
externalities, they are nearly impossible to measure. Baker, supra note 57, at 1392–95. To suggest that 
one creates greater positive externalities or fewer negative externalities than the other is nothing more 
than an exercise in blind bravado. Id.  
 68. For an opinion of why trade is not a zero-sum game but rather a positive-sum game, see Paul 
Krugman, Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 2, 28–44 (1994). Cf. Clyde 
Prestowitz et al., The Fight Over Competitiveness: A Zero-Sum Debate?, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 4, 186–203 
(1994). 
 69. This is standard neoclassical economics, where normative concerns for equity and fairness do 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/7
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cultural exception policies interfere with this process by restricting choice, 
damaging consumer sovereignty,70 and creating a deadweight loss in the 
audiovisual markets.71  
Advocates of this sort of intervention generally feel that there is a 
social benefit that is not captured by the standard free market cost-benefit 
analysis, which justifies limiting consumer choice and distorting 
incentives.72 They would argue that erecting trade barriers, such as 
‘Television Without Frontiers,’ increases domestic production in the 
audiovisual markets, thereby creating a social benefit that outweighs the 
costs of intervention. This approach rests on the presumption that domestic 
market imperfections are best healed through changes in trade policy.73 
However, barriers to trade cloaked in the language of the cultural 
exception fail to directly address the source of the problem: domestic 
underproduction. Domestic market failures are best addressed through 
direct subsidization of producers in the audiovisual sector.74 Several 
countries, including the United States, have domestic support mechanisms 
in place.75 While such grants and subsidies lead to greater levels of 
domestic production,76 they should not be perceived as a remedy to sector-
specific trade deficits.77 Such measures risk creating social welfare losses 
in complementary markets78 with knock-on effects that are impossible to 
not enter the picture. 
 70. See Ramezzana, supra note 54 (an expansion of American productions is not necessarily 
welfare reducing). Id. 
 71. A deadweight loss is a loss of efficiency in an economy due to market interventions that 
distort the incentive of either consumers or producers. Such interventions can further damage the 
markets for complements of the initial good. See PAUL KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY (1997).  
 72. Id. at 226–27.  
 73. Id. at 228.  
 74. Id. 
 75. See Susanne Nikoltchev & Francisco Javier Cabrera Blázquez, National Film Production 
Aid: Legislative Characteristics and Trends, LEGAL OBSERVATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL 
OBSERVATORY, Issue 2001-4, at http://www.obs.coe.int/oea_publ/iiris_plus/focus4_2001.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2004). In the film industry, the British Film Institute (BFI) is a support mechanism for 
the UK, the Centre national de la cinematographie (CNC) is a support mechanism for France, the 
Filmforderungsanstalt (FFA) is a support mechanism for Germany, and the National Endowment for 
the Arts is a support mechanism for the United States. Id. 
 76. See Phillip H. Gordon, Liberte! Fraternite! Anxiety!, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 2002, at 19–20 (“ . . . 
while subsidies for French cinema ensure that more French films are made, they do not make them 
more widely watched or exported”). 
 77. See The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/ 
publications/review/99/09/9909mp.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2004) (“a country runs a trade deficit with 
another country when its exports are less than its imports . . . the rest of the world is shipping to the 
home country more goods and services than the home country is shipping to the rest of the world”).  
 78. See The Environmental Economics Glossary, at http://www.damagevaluation.com/ 
surveyopen.htm.  
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ascertain at the point of intervention. Second, such interventions do not 
take place in a vacuum. Directing valuable resources to one sector of the 
economy necessarily draws resources away from other sectors.79  
Lurking just beneath the surface of the flawed economic justifications 
advanced in support of the doctrine is an omnipresent social justification: a 
fear of homogenization.80 Implicit in this justification is a manufactured 
exigency to respond to the world’s constantly changing parameters. Fear 
of this uncertain future drives policymakers to precipitate action, while 
homogenization conveniently morphs into Americanization. In sum, 
protectionist measures cloaked in the language of the cultural exception 
uniformly contain a subjective, affective element, which is informed by 
anti-Americanism.81
The fear of homogeneity, or becoming American, may indeed be an old 
fear dressed in new clothing.82 Today, the prevailing fear is of 
globalization and its effects. These fears share common bonds: the belief 
that some type of policy response is required to contain the dynamic and 
complex parameters of an ever-changing world, that these changing 
parameters are known and reducible, that, through such a policy response, 
change can be slowed or reversed, and that the best way to achieve this is 
through measures that promote resistance to change and instead celebrate 
cultural heterogeneity.83
 79. This final point cynically, though realistically, highlights the brutal essence of the democratic 
process. Judge Richard Posner explains that when the cultural exception veil is peeled back, the 
economic justifications offered in its support are revealed as nothing more than protectionist measures 
orchestrated at the behest of connected and well-organized special interest entities who trust that the 
average consumer will either be too ignorant or too acquiescent to care about an audiovisual product 
that costs slightly more than the world price. Others have suggested that the democratic process is 
nothing more than institutionalized rent seeking. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW (1998); KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 71, at 229–30; J. PATRICK GUNNING, 
UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRACY: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC CHOICE (2002). 
 80. See Petito, supra note 11. 
 81. Michael D. Bordo et al., Is Globalization Today Really Different than Globalization a 
Hundred Years Ago?, 7195 NAT’L BUR. ECON. RES. 1 (1999); Gordon, supra note 76; Richard Pells, 
Resistance and Transformation: Europe’s Response to American Mass Culture, TRADING CULTURE: 
GATT, EUROPEAN CULTURAL POLICIES AND THE TRANSATLANTIC MARKET (1996); Petito, supra note 
11, at 1143. 
 82. In the 1920s and 1930s, Europeans feared the coming of the consumer society. In the 
immediate post-war years, they feared the Marshall Plan’s cultural component and the “Coca-
Colonization” it allegedly encouraged. See REINHOLD WAGLEITNER, COCA-COLONIZATION AND THE 
COLD WAR: THE CULTURAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES IN AUSTRIA AFTER THE SECOND 
WORLD WAR (1994); Pells, supra note 4.  
 83. To soften the biased nature of such measures, policymakers have taken to couching cultural 
exceptionalism in the rhetoric of cultural pluralism. Yet, the inherent contradiction between self-
promotion and pluralism cannot be ignored. See Jean Tardif, The Hidden Dimensions of Globalization: 
What is at Stake Geoculturally, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tnes/2002/ 
mediaculture.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). See also UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Cultural 
Diversity, Adopted by the 31st Session of the General Conference of UNESCO, Paris, Nov. 2, 2001, at 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/7
p909 Galt.doc  7/21/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004]   LIFE, DEATH, AND REBIRTH OF THE “CULTURAL EXCEPTION” 921 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In truth, the policy responses made in the audiovisual sector are only 
partially constrained by the democratic process.84 The impact that 
ignorance of, or lack of familiarity with, the benefits of free trade has on 
the decision-making process is modest at best. Something more must 
constrain these policymakers. While some have tongue-in-cheek suggested 
that this something is indeed a European-wide strain of neurosis,85 I 
suggest that policy choices, such as the cultural exception, when made in 
the face of uncertainty, are susceptible to cognitive bias and illusion.86 
These biases and illusions in turn feed, and are fed by, anti-American 
sentiment. 
Cognitive bias and illusion “arise from our difficulties in quantifying 
and dealing with uncertainty,”87 “affect people of all levels of expertise 
and field,”88 and “lead to departures from rational thinking.”89 In addition 
to the generalized anxiety created by the advent of globalization, with 
respect to the audiovisual sector, bias and illusion have been incubated by 
slanted media coverage.90 Policy measures, such as the cultural exception, 
which are orchestrated by politicians in response to this coverage, unjustly 
target American popular culture. As a result, policy responses constrained 
by cognitive bias act as a negation of uncertainty, constitute an 
overestimation of the American popular culture’s threat to cultural 
identity, and represent a subjective reliance on intuition rather than on hard 
data.91 When policymakers speak of “managing” or “humanizing” 
globalization,92 they are not dealing with concrete issues.  
While there is no dispute that the United States has enjoyed the fruits 
of globalization in the audiovisual sector, it is unclear that such success 
translates to any substantive homogenization and a respective diminution 
of cultural identity. Homogenization (or its irrational, hate-inspired 
morphological twin, Americanization93), like the legal and economic 
http://www.inst.at/kulturen/unesco/declaration_english.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2004). 
 84. See generally POSNER, supra note 79. 
 85. See Veron, supra note 38.  
 86. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
185 SCIENCE 1124–31 (1974). See also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of 
Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453–58 (1981); Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 136–42 (1982). 
 87. Neville Nicholls, Cognitive Illusions, Heuristics, and Climate Prediction, 80 BULLETIN OF 
THE AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 1385–98 (1999). 
 88. Id. at 1386. 
 89. Id. 
 90. McMahon, supra note 7. 
 91. Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280–85 (1987). 
 92. See Gordon, supra note 76. 
 93. THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 233 (1999).  
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justifications offered above, rests on faulty presumptions. The theory of 
homogenization can only be sustained if you first accept that cultural 
transmission is a one-way street.94 The fear is premised upon the mistaken 
belief that America actively transmits its popular culture to the rest of the 
world, while all other states stand by idly, receiving, but not daring to 
transmit culture themselves. Second, the theory paternalistically presumes 
that the citizens of the world are solely depositories of culture, never 
transforming cultural stimuli.95 Both presumptions are patently false, as 
they push the rest of the world to the sidelines of globalization. However, 
the nations of the world and their citizenry are not standing on the 
sidelines of globalization. They are participants in the process and creators 
of content, uniquely selecting, modifying, and incorporating cultural 
stimuli to fit their own schematic visions.96  
III. SIGNS OF LIFE AND DEATH SINCE URUGUAY  
The preceding section suggests that the legal, economic, and social 
justifications sustaining the cultural exception doctrine rest upon shaky 
theoretical grounds and are thus somewhat misguided. Whether grounded 
in reality or not, the doctrine’s fate is far from sealed. While it is clear that 
the “trade and culture” linkage has taken a backseat to other more pressing 
issues on the global trade agenda, the events of recent years paint a 
confusing picture of the doctrine’s vitality.97 This section thoroughly 
examines several key developments that have impacted the audiovisual 
sector since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in order to make an 
ultimate determination as to whether the cultural exception doctrine is 
alive and well.  
A. Canada’s De-listing of Country Music Television  
Fresh off their success in retaining the cultural exclusion in NAFTA98 
and perhaps building on the momentum generated by the “Agreement to 
Disagree,”99 cultural exception apologists in Canada decided to push the 
envelope in early 1994.100 In a move that resembled President Lázaro 
 94. See Pells, supra note 81. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Many scholars have suggested that we may be experiencing a state of “globalization fatigue,” 
implying that members of the US and EU political establishment have grown tired of the pace of trade 
liberalization in the wake of the rapid succession of the NAFTA and WTO agreements. 
 98. See supra notes 31–37 and accompanying text. 
 99. See supra note 41. 
 100. Canada has fiercely defended its cultural industries from US domination for decades. See 
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Cardenas’ nationalization of foreign oil reserves in the late 1930s, the 
Canadian government’s regulatory broadcasting department, the Canadian 
Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC),101 de-
listed the US-owned Country Music Channel from Canadian cable,102 
ending a successful ten-year run.103 Taking advantage of the void, the 
CRTC created the New Country Network (NCN), owned by a Canadian 
cable programmer.104 The United States Trade Representative (USTR), 
Mickey Kantor, responded105 to the de-listing by threatening to invoke 
section 301 of the 1974 US Trade Act.106 After months of posturing, a full-
blown trade war107 with our immediate neighbor and largest trade 
Paul, supra note 22, citing John Herd Thompson, Canada’s Quest for Cultural Sovereignty: 
Protection, Promotion, and Popular Culture, NORTH AMERICA WITHOUT BORDERS? INTEGRATING 
CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND MEXICO 269–83 (1992). See also Oliver R. Goodenough, 
Defending the Imaginary to the Death: Free Trade, National Identity, and Canada’s Cultural 
Preoccupation, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 203 (1998); J. Michael Robinson, The Information 
Revolution, Culture and Sovereignty—A Canadian Perspective, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 147 (1998). 
 101. Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission Act, R.S.C., ch. C-22 
(1985). See also Stephen R. Konigsberg, Note, Think Globally, Act Locally: North American Free 
Trade, Canadian Cultural Industry Exemption, and the Liberalization of the Broadcast Ownership 
Laws, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 281, 283 (1994), citing U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement 
Biennial Report (Jan. 1991) at 1, available at 1991 WL 329550. 
 102. CRTC Decision 94-284, 128 C. Gaz. pt. I, at 3047-48 (1994); CRTC Public Notices 1994-60, 
61-1, 128 C. Gaz. pt. I, at 3035-39 (1994). See also Andrew M. Carlson, Note, The Country Music 
Television Dispute: An Illustration of the Tensions Between Canadian Cultural Protectionism and 
American Entertainment Exports, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 585 (1997); Amy E. Lehmann, Note, 
The Canadian Cultural Exemption Clause and the Fight to Maintain an Identity, 23 SYRACUSE J. 
INT’L L. & COM. 187 (1997); Robin L. Van Harpen, Note, Mamas, Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to 
Be Cowboys: Reconciling Trade and Cultural Independence, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 165 (1995).  
 103. See Karen Elizabeth Rinaman, Country Music Television and Cultural Protectionism, 
Working Paper, MANDALA PROJECTS, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT DATABASE; see also Lorraine 
Woellert, Foreign Backlash Grows vs. US Culture, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1996, at A1.  
 104. CRTC Public Notices 1994-60, 61-1, 128 C. Gaz. pt. I, at 3036 (1994). 
 105. The US Trade Representative is a cabinet-level position that “acts as the principal trade 
advisor, negotiator, and spokesperson for the President on trade and related investment matters . . . 
‘USTR’ refers both to the agency and to the agency head, the US Trade Representative.” USTR’s 
Role, available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-ustr/ustrrole.shtml. Michael Kantor was the United States 
Trade Representative during President Bill Clinton’s first term. See Office of U.S. Trade 
Representative, U.S. Response to Recent Canadian Trade-Related Decisions, U.S. DEP’T ST. 
DISPATCH 21 (1995). 
 106. Section 301(a) enables the USTR to retaliate when another state has breached a trade 
agreement with the United States, and section 301(b) enables the USTR to retaliate when another 
state’s actions “burden or restrict United States commerce.” Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411–
2420 (1994); Carlson, supra note 102. 
 107. A trade war is “a category of intense international conflict where states interact, bargain, and 
retaliate primarily over economic objectives directly related to the traded goods or service sectors of 
their economies, and where the means used are restrictions on the free flow of goods and services.” 
JOHN CONYBEARE, TRADE WARS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
RIVALRY 3 (1987).  
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partner108 was ultimately avoided by a simple mechanism of the free 
market:109 CMT negotiated a deal to purchase twenty percent of NCN 
from its parent company. The deal, finalized on March 7, 1996,110 
involved an initial allotment for a twenty percent stake of NCN (with the 
understanding that when Canada revised upward its foreign ownership 
ceiling, CMT would buy an additional thirteen point three percent).111 
Although Canada was forced to relent partially in the face of a trade war, 
if there ever was a “golden era” of the cultural exception, this was it.  
B. Canada’s Attack on Sports Illustrated 
Meanwhile, a separate cultural dispute between Canada and the United 
States had been developing for some time.112 Customs’ tariffs prohibiting 
the importation of so-called “split-run”113 magazines into Canada had been 
on the legislative books for years.114 However, the situation exploded 
when US-based Time Warner began to circumvent these restrictions by 
electronically beaming the content of its Sports Illustrated magazine to 
printing facilities across the border.115 Clearly upsetting the Canadian 
cultural establishment, the Canadian Parliament, justifying its move on the 
 108. Given the economic mutual dependence of Canada and the United States and their strong 
geopolitical ties, a trade war would have been irrational. When Neighbors Embrace, ECONOMIST, July 
5, 1997, at 21–23. For current statistics on the level of trade between the two countries and Mexico, 
see the North American International Trade Corridor Partnership (NAITCP), available at 
http://www.naitcp2004.com/welcome.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2004).  
 109. Mickey Kantor’s earlier posturing, through repeated threats of retaliatory sanctions, certainly 
“greased the wheels” of the free market and created significant background leverage. Michael Burgi, 
Sabers Rattle in Row over Country Music; Canada’s Ban on U.S. Cable Channel Leads to Threats 
from Washington, ADWEEK, May 29, 1995, at 12. See also Retaliation is Threatened Over Canada’s 
Limitations on the Broadcasting of U.S. Radio and TV Programs, N. AM. FREE TRADE & INVEST. 
REP., Feb. 15, 1996, available at 1996 WL 10175250.  
 110. See Carlson, supra note 102, citing CMT Makes Canada Connection, MEDIAWEEK, Mar. 11, 
1996, at 3; Country Music TV Dispute Resolved; U.S., Canadian Firms Finalize Deal, 13 INT’L TRADE 
REP. (BNA) 11, at 421 (Mar. 13, 1996). 
 111. See Carlson, supra note 102, citing Direction to the CRTC (Ineligibility of Non-Canadians) 
SOR/96-192, 130 C. Gaz. pt. II, at 1296, 1299 (1996); Canada Eases Foreign Ownership Limits on 
Broadcasting, Cable TV Holding Firms, 13 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 16, 646 (Apr. 17, 1996); 
Rinaman, supra note 103. 
 112. See generally Ian Slotin, Free Speech and the Visage Culturel: Canadian and American 
Perspectives on Pop Culture Discrimination, 111 YALE L.J. 2289, 2293 (2002); Paul, supra note 22; 
Goodenough, supra note 100. 
 113. A split-run magazine is “a foreign-owned magazine that prints a second edition of a 
magazine issue in Canada in order to qualify for treatment as Canadian.” Media Awareness Network, 
at http://www.media-awareness.ca/english/resources/legislation/canadian_law/federal/excise_tax_act. 
cfm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).  
 114. Tariff Code 9958, as amended, ch. 49, § 114, 1987 S.C. 1407, 1452, 3308-10. 
 115. See Slotin, supra note 112, citing Hale E. Hedley, Canadian Cultural Policy and the NAFTA: 
Problems Facing the U.S. Copyright Industries, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 655, 674 (1995).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/7
p909 Galt.doc  7/21/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004]   LIFE, DEATH, AND REBIRTH OF THE “CULTURAL EXCEPTION” 925 
 
 
 
 
 
 
grounds of cultural survival,116 passed a prohibitive excise tax (eighty 
percent) on all advertising revenue generated from split-run magazines 
sales across the country.117 Taking a different route, the United States 
opted to advance its cause before the WTO’s newly formed Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB).118 Because the recently enacted excise tax did not 
apply to domestic magazines,119 the United States argued that the tax 
clearly violated the national treatment principle of GATT article III.120 
Attempting to exploit shortcomings in the embryonic GATS,121 Canada 
countered that GATT article III was not applicable because the principal 
focus of the controversy was over advertising services rather than split-run 
goods.122 In essence, Canada suggested that GATS was the relevant 
framework for analysis and that it had made no such national treatment 
commitments with respect to advertising services under that framework.123 
In a blow to cultural exception proponents, a panel of the DSB ruled in 
favor of the United States, reasoning that split-run and ordinary magazines 
were essentially similar products for the purposes of national treatment.124 
Some have suggested that the effect of this decision was the “implicit 
rejection of Canada’s claim that cultural goods cannot be subject to GATT 
national treatment requirements.”125 While the Appellate Body later 
softened the panel’s ruling, it still held that the excise tax was a manifest 
 116. Slotin, supra note 112, citing Peter Lichtenbaum & Selma Lussenburg, Canadian Law, 31 
INT’L LAW. 477 (1997). 
 117. An Act To Amend the Excise Tax Act and the Income Tax Act, ch. 46, § 36, 1995 S.C. at 5. 
 118. Instead of pursuing Section 301 bilateral sanctions in the CMT dispute, the United States 
turned to one of the multilateral institutions to which it was a party. The United States could have 
either pursued action under the NAFTA’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), or the WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The United States wisely chose the later option due to the cultural 
exclusion provision of NAFTA. Paul, supra note 22, at n.191.  
 119. Slotin, supra note 112, citing Peter Lichtenbaum & Selma Lussenburg, Canadian Law, 31 
INT’L L. 477 (1997).  
 120. Paul, supra note 22, citing the WTO Dispute Panel Report on Canada—Certain Measures 
Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS 31/R (Mar. 14, 1997) [hereinafter Panel Report].  
 121. GATS is a young instrument that has not yet matured into a set of binding commitments on 
the member states with regard to its cultural sectors. A few countries, notably the United States, Brazil, 
Switzerland, and Japan, have made proposals for more progressive commitments in sectors touching 
cultural industries. However, given the manner in which GATS divides the trade in services into non-
binding “general obligations” and binding “specific commitments”, member states have been able to 
evade locking themselves into progressive liberalization in the cultural sectors. Jock Given, Culture, 
Trade, Terror and the World Trade Organization, METRO 133, 214–23 (2002).  
 122. Panel Report, supra note 120, at 3.33. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 5.25. 
 125. Paul, supra note 22, at 48. 
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violation of GATT article III,126 thus constituting a dramatic setback to 
cultural exception proponents around the world.  
C. Challenging Australia’s 1995 Content Standard  
In a similar philosophical vein to the Television without Frontiers 
Directive, Australia’s regulatory telecommunications industry 
implemented a minimum content standard,127 requiring that fifty-five 
percent of all programming between 6 a.m. and midnight be Australian-
produced broadcasts.128 The Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA) 
indicated that the “object of the standard [was] to promote the role of 
commercial television in developing and reflecting a sense of Australian 
identity, character and cultural diversity by supporting the community's 
continued access to programs produced under Australian creative 
control."129 Although the standard has been modified twice,130 both 
changes have merely fleshed out the initial standard and lend greater 
clarity and specificity to the terms “Australian creative control" and 
"Australian programming."131  
In Project Blue Skies Inc. v. Australian Broadcasting Authority,132 the 
Australian High Court upheld a lower court’s ruling that the 1995 Content 
Standard violated the terms of a bilateral trade agreement between New 
Zealand and Australia.133 In that case, a group of New Zealand television 
producers scored a minor victory for opponents of the cultural exception, 
by arguing that their programs be included (as Australian) within the scope 
of the domestic content limitation.134 This ruling prompted the subsequent 
 126. Id., citing WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, 
WT/DS31/AB/R (adopted June 30, 1997) [hereinafter Appellate Report]. 
 127. See Franco Papandrea, Cultural Regulation of Australian Television Programs, BUREAU OF 
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS (1977). 
 128. The Broadcasting Services Australian Content Standard was determined under paragraph 
122(1)(a) of the Broadcasting Services Act (1992), which was issued by the Australian Broadcasting 
Authority on Dec. 15, 1995. See ABA, Review of Australian Content Standard (July 1998), at 
http://www.aba.gov.au/abanews/news_releases/1998/68nr98.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). 
 129. Id. at 1. See also Angela J. Campbell, Lessons From Oz: Quantitative Guidelines for 
Children’s Educational Television, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 119, 135 (1997). 
 130. First, by Broadcasting Services Australian Content Standard Variation 1999 (No. 1), and then 
again by Broadcasting Services Australian Content Standard Variation 2002 (No. 1). 
 131. See ABA, Content Regulation, available at http://www.aba.gov.au/tv/content (Apr. 15, 
2004).  
 132. Project Blue Skies, Inc. v. Australian Broadcasting Authority, 194 CLR 355 (1998). 
 133. Australia-New Zealand: Closer Economic Relations-Trade Agreement, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 
945 (1983). 
 134. Franco Papandrea, Trans Tasman Blues: Australian Content on Television, 1998 
COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH FORUM, available at http://www.dca.gov.au/cif/papers98/ 
papandrea.doc (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). 
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amendments to the Australian Content Standard to avoid similar problems 
in the future.  
D. EU Media Programs and Domestic Schemes  
As the logical extension to the Television without Frontiers Directive, 
the Media II program135 supplemented domestic subsidies in the 
audiovisual sector at the institutional level. Taking effect in January of 
1996, Media II succeeded an earlier support structure, Media I.136 It 
pumped some 310 million Euro, in the form of additional grants and 
subsidies, into the audiovisual sector during a time when tensions were 
running high.137 Though not a grand sum,138 it served to bolster domestic 
subsidies in the audiovisual sector and further fan the oppositional flames 
of the cultural exception. 
France is the primary force that has driven the EU’s policies of cultural 
protectionism.139 While the Television without Frontiers Directive 
mandates a majority (fifty-one percent) of broadcast time be reserved for 
European films “where practicable” and “by appropriate means,”140 France 
has imposed an even more stringent minimum European content 
requirement of sixty percent (forty percent of which must be French).141 
The limitations apply at all hours of the day, thereby thwarting foreign 
access to the “lucrative prime time market.”142 Additionally, France 
 135. Media II is the product of two European Council decisions. See Council Decision 95/564/EC 
(Media II) (1995 O.J. (L321) 33, 38, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/aupolicy/legis/ 
legis_en.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004) (implementing a training program for professionals in the 
European audiovisual program industry); Council Decision 95/563/EC (Media II—Development and 
Distribution), 1995 O.J. (L321) 25, 32, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/aupolicy/legis/ 
legis_en.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004) (implementing a program encouraging the development and 
distribution of European audiovisual works).  
 136. Today, Media II has been replaced by Media Plus. Council Decision 2000/821/EC, 2000 O.J. 
(L 336) 82. See also http://europa.eu.int/comm/avpolicy/intro/intro.en.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).  
 137. Harvey B. Feigenbaum, Public Policy and the Private Sector in Audiovisual Industries, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1767 (2002), citing EU Ministers Agree on Funding for MEDIA Plus, HOLLYWOOD 
REP., Nov. 27, 2000, at 5. 
 138. Minister of Culture Suvi Lindén, Opening Speech at the Forum on Audiovisual Policy, 
Helsinki, Finland, Sept. 9–10, 1999, available at http://www.minedu.fi/eupresidency/eng/index.html 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2004) (suggesting that the audiovisual sector was still grossly under-funded).  
 139. Laurence G. C. Kaplan, The European Community’s ‘Television without Frontiers’ 
Directive: Stimulating Europe to Regulate Culture, 8 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 255 (1994). 
 140. Parliament & Council Directive 97/36/EC, 1997 O.J. (L 202) 60, 70, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/aupolicy/regul/twf/newint_en.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004) (amending 
Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation, 
or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities). 
 141. See Ramezzana, supra note 54. 
 142. See USTR 2002 Report on EU service sectors, available at http://www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/ 
2002/europeanunion.PDF (last visited Apr. 15, 2004) [hereinafter USTR Report]. 
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maintains a restrictive radio broadcast quota, which requires all pop music 
stations to meet a forty percent domestic content requirement.143 In 
Germany, the government sponsored Youth Protection Authority is 
empowered to index any film it deems “unsuitable for minors.”144 Costs of 
re-editing to meet the standards can be “prohibitively expensive.”145 Italy 
has followed France’s lead by increasing the minimum content 
requirement146 to fifty-one percent, and excluding all prime time talk 
shows from counting toward the requirement.147 In Spain, a slightly less 
stringent film quota system has been enacted, whereby movie houses are 
required to show “one day of EU-produced film for every three days of 
non-EU-produced film.”148  
E. France’s Messier Affair 
In one of the more recent indications of mass consolidation within the 
audiovisual sector, on December 6, 2000, 96.6 percent of the shareholders 
voted149 in favor of a merger between Vivendi SA, the French 
telecommunication powerhouse, and Seagram Company, the Canadian 
drinks conglomerate and parent of Universal Pictures.150 Jean-Marie 
Messier, chairman of Vivendi SA, masterminded the merger that created 
Vivendi Universal.151 Less than a year later, the same man who engaged 
Vivendi Universal from a small water utility company to the world’s 
second largest media player was caught off-balance, declaring, “The 
 143. Id. See also Judith Beth Prowda, US Dominance in the “Marketplace of Culture” and the 
French “Cultural Exception,” 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. AND POL. 193, 206 (Fall 1996–Winter 1997), 
citing Alan Riding, Where Is the Glory That Was France?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1996, at B1; Carlson, 
supra note 102. 
 144. See USTR Report, supra note 142, at 127; Margaret Moore, Sex and Violence: European 
Censorship of American Films, 11 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1 (1994), citing Motion Picture Export 
Association of American International Censorship Documents (revised Apr. 1990). 
 145. See USTR Report, supra note 142, at 128. 
 146. Regulators of content requirements often have a difficult time determining a product’s origin 
because some films have a director from one country, actors from another, and are co-produced in yet 
another country. See FEIGENBAUM, supra note 8. 
 147. See USTR Report, supra note 142, at 128; Jon Filipek, ‘Culture Quotas’: The Trade 
Controversy Over the EC’s Broadcasting Directive, 28 STAN. J. INT’L L. 323, 334 (1992). 
 148. See USTR Report, supra note 142, at 128. 
 149. See Vivendi Universal’s Press Release Archive, http://www.vivendiuniversal.com/vu/ 
en/press_2004 (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).  
 150. See Gregg Kilday, Parlez-vous Universal?, at http://archive.salon.com/business/feature/ 
2000/06/22/vivendi (last visited Apr. 16, 2004) (noting that Universal Pictures is the “home of such 
enduring Americana as Frankenstein, . . . Jaws, and E.T.”). 
 151. See Timeline: The Rise and Fall of Jean-Marie Messier, THE GUARDIAN (July 1, 2002), 
http://media.guardian.co.uk/broadcast/story/0,7493,747403,00.html (on file with the Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review). 
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French cultural exception is dead.”152 This comment was particularly 
alarming to cultural exception subscribers because Vivendi Universal is 
also the parent company of Canal-Plus, the French television channel and 
production house responsible for financing one-third of all French 
productions.153 The French government was quick to distance itself from 
the statement, with Catherine Tasca, French Culture Minister,154 quoted as 
saying, “This is a proposal by a businessman who is developing his group 
on the other side of the Atlantic [and] definitely not the policy of this 
government.”155 Though Messier later tried to soften his statement by 
stressing the fresh rubric of cultural diversity,156 the statement must be 
viewed as a serious indication of the current temperature of the battle over 
the cultural exception, as should the swift response of the French cultural 
elite.157 By July, Messier was ousted, partially pushed by an advisor to 
French President Jacques Chirac.158  
F. European Commission Attacks the Cultural Exception 
Citing concerns about the impact it may have on non-French 
advertising agencies, the European Commission took action against a 
French law prohibiting certain retail groups from advertising on 
television.159 In early May 2002, the Commission asked the French 
government for a justification of the law.160 The government of France 
argued that the prohibition is necessary to protect the local press, couching 
their argument in terms of the cultural exception.161 The goal of EU single 
market legislation is the harmonization of domestic laws, including those 
laws applying to the services sectors.162 Yet, as the European Union 
continues this process of internal market harmonization, any “exceptions” 
 152. See Franck, supra note 6; Cavanaugh, supra note 10. 
 153. Alan Riding, Remark by Vivendi Chief Unnerves French Film Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 
2001, at E1. 
 154. Comparatively, the United States does not have a Ministry of Culture. 
 155. See Gordon, supra note 76. 
 156. See supra note 83 and accompanying text; Riding, supra note 153.  
 157. See Bruce Crumley, The Old Guard’s Revenge, TIME EUROPE (July 15, 2002), available at 
http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/article/0,13005,901020715-300626,00.html (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2004). 
 158. Id. See also Timeline, supra note 151. 
 159. Francesco Guerrera, “Brussels Moves on Advertising Rules in France” (May 9, 2002), FIN. 
TIMES, available at 2002 WL 20298945. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. A European Commission official remarked, “the single market relies on the freedom to 
provide services anywhere in the union.” Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p909 Galt.doc  7/21/2004  
 
 
 
 
930    WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 3:909 
 
 
 
 
 
 
that impact others outside the union will be harder to justify.163 
Presumably, the accession of thirteen new members will merely accentuate 
this problem.164  
G. Survival of the High Cultural Exception at Doha 
There really is no fight over the cultural exception as it applies to 
“high” culture.165 One author has characterized the results of the 
November 2001 WTO Ministerial Summit as permitting the “survival of 
the ‘cultural exception’ in the Doha agenda.” The battleground for the 
debate is over popular culture because “this is where the money is truly at 
stake on both sides.”166 Nonetheless, the survival of the cultural exception 
in any form, regardless of its application, could be perceived as an omen 
that opponents have begun to lose their grip.  
H. 9/11 
1. The Global Response to 9/11 
On September 11, 2001, terrorists crashed airplanes into the twin 
towers of the World Trade Center, grossly damaged the Pentagon, and 
crashed United flight No. 93 near Shanksville, Pennsylvania.167 While a 
large majority of the world condemned the action, which was 
masterminded by the al Qaeda organization168 and resulted in the swift 
passage of UN Security Council Resolutions 1368, 1373, and 1377,169 
there has since been a muted but slow-building chorus that America 
“deserved it.”170 While no one suggests that proponents of the cultural 
 163. Heather Field, EU Enlargement, Popular Culture and Cultural Policy: Transition and 
Change, FOCUS, circular no. 13, (Feb. 2002). 
 164. Editorial, France’s Europe, FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 22, 2002), available at 2002 WL 
3304034. 
 165. Slotin, supra note 112, at n.5. 
 166. Slotin, supra note 112, citing Goodenough, supra note 100. 
 167. Serge Schmemann, U.S. Attacked: President Vows to Exact Punishment for ‘Evil’, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A1. 
 168. The attacks received near-universal condemnation. See G.A. Res. 9959, U.N. GAOR, 56th 
Sess., 46th mtg., U.N. Doc. GA/9959 (2001). The al Qaeda organization is an “international terrorist 
network” with “autonomous underground cells” in some sixty countries, including the United States. It 
“seeks to purge Muslim countries of what it sees as the profane influence of the West and replace their 
governments with a fundamentalist Islamic regime.” Terrorism: Questions and Answers, THE 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, available at http://www.cfrterrorism.org/groups/alqaeda.html (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2004).  
 169. See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001); 
S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001); and S.C. Res. 
1377, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377 (2001). 
 170. See Thomas L. Friedman, Yes, but What?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2001, at A27; Dateline: Why 
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exception partook in the terrorist attacks, there has been evidence that for 
quite some time radical anti-West rhetoric is bleeding into mainstream 
anti-Americanism.171 In this sense, it was a mistake to refer to the cultural 
exclusion as the most virulent strain of the cultural exception.172 This may 
be true of defensive measures taken within the context of the international 
trade regime, but the paradigm gets turned on its head when we speak of 
an all-out offensive cultural war or cultural execution. Increased incidence 
of a cultural jihad against America makes traditional anti-Americanism 
cloaked in the language of the cultural exception much more palatable. As 
the bar reaches the extreme end of the spectrum, proponents of the softer 
cultural exception may enjoy a victory by default.  
2. French Intransigence with Respect to Iraq 
While the majority of the international community initially supported 
the Bush administration’s “War on Terror,”173 military action in Iraq did 
not come without considerable domestic and international resistance, 
largely due to the U.S. administration’s failure to convince the 
international mainstream media and policymakers of the link between the 
al Qaeda network and the Iraqi regime.174 Notwithstanding this failure, the 
They Hate US (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 7, 2001); Karl Weinberg, Anti-War or Anti-American, 
Jan. 30, 2003, available at http://www.american daily.com/item/476 (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).  
 171. See Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1992, at 53–65; 
Jonah Goldberg, The Specter of McDonalds: An Object of Bottomless Hatred, NATIONAL REVIEW 
(June 5, 2000), http://www.nationalreview.com/05june00/goldberg0605.html (last visited Apr. 16, 
2004); Stephen Zunes, The US as Global Outcast: Growing Anti-Americanism, FOREIGN POLICY IN 
FOCUS (July 2001), available at http://www.fpir.org/commentary/2001/0107outcast.html (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2004); Martin Kettle, US Bashing: It’s All the Rage in Europe, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2001, at 
B4; and Stephen Erlanger, In Europe, Some Say the Attacks Stemmed from American Feelings, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2001, at B12.  
 172. See supra note 32. 
 173. In the days following 9/11, over 130 countries and numerous governmental and non-
governmental organizations pledged various forms of support to the United States in its campaign 
against the al Qaeda network. See Foreign Support of the U.S. War on Terrorism, Report for Congress, 
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6207.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). 
 174. Brian Ross, Weak Link, Feb. 5, 2002, at http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/ 
DailyNews/ansar030205_Krekar.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004); John Diamond, Connection Sought 
between Iraq, Al Qaeda, July 29, 2002, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002-07-
28-iraq-al-qaeda_x.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004); Paul Reynolds, Analysis: Iraq and Al Qaeda, Oct. 
28, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2284123.stm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004); 
The Main Event, Mar. 17, 2002, available at http://www.mapleleafweb.com/education/ 
spotlight/issue_12 (last visited Apr. 16, 2004) (Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien stated “at this 
time . . . there is no link between Al Qaeda and Iraq that I know of.”). Id. However, the Bush 
administration may have convinced the American populace that such a link existed in the build-up to 
the war. See Linda Feldman, The Impact of Bush Linking 9/11 and Iraq, Mar. 14, 2003, available at 
http://www.aaiusa.org/news/must_read03_14a_03.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).  
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ubiquitous cat-and-mouse tactics of the Iraqi regime were sufficient to 
persuade the international community to support the draft resolution on 
Iraq submitted by the United States, United Kingdom, and Spain on 
February 24, 2003.175 After several weeks of passive resistance by Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein to weapons inspections mandated by UN 
Security Council Resolution 1441,176 French President Jacques Chirac 
vowed to veto any further Security Council resolution that would make 
war with Iraq inevitable.177 More than a simple desire to occupy the “high 
moral ground,”178 Chirac’s stance symbolizes the international 
community’s negative reaction to the unilateralist posturing of the Bush 
administration.179 Such posturing encourages proponents of the cultural 
exception to deviate from the binding legal norms of the multilateral 
trading system and risk “going it alone”180 in the face of American 
hegemony. 
 175. U.S. Dept. of State, Draft Resolution on Iraq Offered by U.S., U.K. Spain (Submitted to U.N. 
Security Council, Feb. 24, 2003), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/0302241.html 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2004). Ironically, the President’s decision to amass US troops near the Iraqi 
border spawned a degree of cooperation with inspectors on the part of the Iraqi regime that may have 
convinced the international community that war was unnecessary.  
 176. See S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002). 
This followed ten resolutions issued over the course of eleven years of Iraqi obstructionism. See also 
S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990); htt S.C. Res. 678, 
U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990); S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, 46th 
Sess., 2978th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/686 (1991); S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mgt., 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991); S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982nd mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/688 (1991); S.C. Res. 707, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3004th mtg., U.N. Dox. S/RES/707 (1991); 
S.C. Res. 715,U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3012th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/715 (1991); S.C. Res. 986,U.N. 
SCOR, 50th Sess., 3519th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/986 (1995); S.C. Res. 1284, U.N. SCOR, 54th 
Sess., 4084th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284 (1994); S.C. Res. 1382, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4431st 
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1382 (2001). 
 177. During a live television interview, Chirac stated, “My position is that whatever the 
circumstances, France will vote no.” Elaine Sciolino, France to Veto Resolution on Iraq War, Chirac 
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2003, at A10.  
 178. Robert Graham, No One Dares Put a Price on the Cost of Breaking So Sharply with the US 
over a Major Issue, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003, at A11. 
 179. A series of unilateralist moves taken by the Bush administration have contributed to this 
negative reaction: the decision to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty, the rejection of the 
International Criminal Court, the withdrawal from the Kyoto Global Warming Treaty, the 
unwillingness to sign the treaty banning the use of land mines, and Bush’s Doctrine of Preemption. Ivo 
H. Daalder & James M. Lindsay, Unilateralism is Alive and Well in Washington, INT’L HERALD 
TRIBUNE, Dec. 21, 2001, at 4; Michael J. Kelly, The Bush Foreign Policy 2001–2003: Unilateralist 
Theory in a Multilateral World, and the Opportunity for Change Offered by Iraq, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 221 (2003); Graham, supra note 183; Robert F. Drinan, Bush’s Unilateralism 
Aggravates World’s Problem’s, NCR ONLINE, available at http://www.finalarticles.com/cf_dls/ 
m1141/10_39/96738447/p1/article.jhtml (last visited Apr. 16, 2004); Kyle Lohmeier, The Joys of 
Unilateralism, THE HOUSTON REVIEW, July 29, 2001, available at http://www.houstonreview.com/ 
articles/lohmeier/KL20010729.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). 
 180. Jeffrey Donovan, Powell Says Washington Will Go It Alone if Necessary, RFE, available at 
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/02/06022002090755.asp (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).  
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IV. THE FUTURE OF THE CULTURAL EXCEPTION 
Today, the deployment of the cultural exception doctrine seems to be 
code for the dual desire to slow the pace of globalization while evaluating 
some of its unintended consequences. Domestic subsidies and recognition 
of the importance of cultural diversity are the order of the day, and the 
place where proponents and opponents of the cultural exception are most 
likely to find common ground.181 In truth, however, these accommodations 
amount to little more than an extension of the “Agreement to Disagree.”182 
The intense debate that nearly derailed seven years of trade negotiations 
has largely been shifted to the back burner.183 Yet, as the Bush 
administration continues to struggle with the impossible task of balancing 
unilateralism and internationalism, the potential for reheating the debate 
remains.184 Persistent unilateralism, even that which apparently falls 
outside the confines of the international trade architecture, may potentially 
undermine universalization of public international legal norms fostered by 
the trade architecture.185 Just as Chirac obstinately refused to bend to 
 181. Jack Valenti, president of the Motion Picture Association of America, Hollywood’s primary 
lobbying arm, recently confirmed as much. Alan Riding, Filmmakers Seek Protection from US 
Dominance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, at E3; but see Pierre Suavé and Karsten Steinfatt, Towards 
Multilateral Rules on Trade and Culture: Protective Regulation or Efficient Protection?, paper 
presented to Achieving Better Regulation of Services Conference, June 26–27, 2000, available at 
http://www.pc.gov.au/research/confproc/abros/paper13.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2004) (“unless 
something is done in the coming years . . . the existing tension between trade in culture will increase 
rather than decrease . . . ”). 
 182. In fact, the United States, in the preliminary stages of the Doha Round, has requested a 
“standstill” in the audiovisual sector. This had the effect of freezing the current state of affairs. Id. 
This, coupled with the fact that the round’s agreed-upon agenda focused on developing countries, 
suggests that both proponents and opponents of the cultural exception may prefer this murky middle 
ground for the time being.  
 183. For instance, GATS remains a largely undefined instrument that is only as legitimate as the 
binding “specific commitments” that the member states are willing to take. See supra note 121; Dr. 
Des Freedman, Trade Versus Culture: An Evaluation of the Impact of Current GATS Negotiations on 
Audio-visual Industries, 2002, available at http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/freedman.html (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2004).  
 184. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell embodies this struggle. In remarks made at a business 
event in China, just a month after 9/11, Powell stated that “nobody’s calling us unilateral anymore . . . 
that’s kind of gone away for the time being . . . we’re so multilateral it keeps me up twenty-four hours 
a day checking on everybody . . . nobody accuses us of that anymore . . . they can see that America is 
prepared to be a leader in this new campaign against a threat that is against all of civilization.” 
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Address to Regional Business Leaders in Shanghai (Oct. 18, 2001), 
at http://www.usembassy.it/file2001_10/alia/a1102232.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004). See also US 
Wheat Associates, September 11 and the Aftermath: Implications for Trade, Presented to ABITRIGO, 
Nov. 2001, available at http://www.uswheat.org/marketnews.nsf/0/562b2682535327e385256b0600 
540f08?OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 16, 2004); Suave, supra note 181.  
 185. For a discussion on the role that the GATT/WTO framework plays in fostering public 
international law norms, see Brian F. Fitzgerald, Trade-Based Constitutionalisms: The Framework for 
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another UN Iraqi resolution, the nations of the world may opt to bring the 
cultural exception doctrine back to the forefront and apply its core 
principles to issue areas well beyond the scope of the audiovisual sector of 
the international trade regime.186 As the United States continues to 
jeopardize universality norms, exceptions to universality advanced by 
other nations become more plausible. 
That said, globalization cannot be stopped. The sovereign citizen 
consumers of the world are unlikely to stand on the sidelines while their 
elected representatives throw up smokescreens and take stock of the so-
called damage. Instead, they will continue to participate in shaping 
globalization’s process and content by actively selecting and modifying 
cultural messages from around the globe.187 A monolithic American 
popular culture will not pervade the world, but instead several cultural 
hybrids,188 affected but not overwhelmed by American popular culture, 
will be the likely result. Elements of American popular culture exported 
via the audiovisual sector will be transfigured to fit within an individual’s 
unique cultural schema comprised of his or her own pre-existing tastes and 
preferences.189 One must also remember that consumers drive technology. 
Recent advances in the areas of broadcast satellites and digital 
compression have greatly muted the impact of content requirements and 
other trade policy instruments, partially nullifying the debate over the 
cultural exception.190 Moreover, the sale of Canal-Plus to an American 
production house further indicates that globalization will bring continued 
consolidation in an industry where America is already the dominant 
force.191 One can only speculate as to the impact that the sale of the 
production house responsible for financing one-third of all French 
productions will have on the future of the cultural exception.  
Finally, the European Union faces a formidable road ahead with the 
competing goals of harmonization and enlargement.192 While Europe 
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(through its cultural mouthpiece: France) fears cultural homogeneity, the 
European Union seeks harmonization and uniformity of laws and 
regulations among its member states. As the Treaty of Nice paves the way 
for enlargement, exceptions will necessarily be made for the commitments 
of new European Union member states. The delicate balance of protecting 
national identities while promoting some nebulous brand of “European 
culture”193 will make the cultural exception all the more difficult to 
articulate. Finally, consumer sovereignty, technological change, and 
perhaps another dominant voice within the European Union194 will prove 
too powerful to keep in check. The collective hand of EU negotiators will 
be forced to make further concessions and jumpstart GATS negotiations in 
the audiovisual sector, perhaps extracting valuable concessions from the 
United States in other sectors.195 However, if the “trade and culture” 
linkage is not squarely addressed soon, the European Union may find itself 
in a position whereby its concessions in the audiovisual sector are of little 
value at the negotiating table. 
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